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Illinois' Crime Victims Compensation Act
If a man has committed robbery and is caught, that man shall be
put to death. If a robber is not caught, the man who has been
robbed shall formally declare whatever he has lost before God, and
the city and the mayor in whose territory or district the robbery
has been committed shall replace whatever he has lost for him. If
it is the life of the owner that is lost, the city or the mayor shall
pay one maneh of silver to his kinsfolk.'
Illinois has joined the ranks of other progressive jurisdictions by
coming to the aid of victims of violent crimes. In 1973, the Illinois
legislature, by passage of the Crime Victims Compensation Act,'
attempted to ease the financial burdens imposed on persons who
have been victimized by violent crime. The Crime Victims Compen-
sation Act, as defined in a brochure prepared by the Secretary of
State,
[i]s designed to help reduce the financial burdens often imposed
on innocent persons who are seriously injured by violent crimes
and also to encourage cooperation with law enforcement agencies.
Such cooperation is necessary for effective law enforcement.3
Several rationales have been advanced as the underlying basis for
victims compensation type legislation. One theory is based upon the
notion that the state owes a legal obligation to protect its citizenry.
This obligation has been conceptualized as follows:
Due to the very nature of our legal system in general, and our
system of criminal law in particular, the state has the duty of
protecting its citizens and of providing effective remedies for
wrongs. When a crime is committed, the state has failed in its duty
of protection and subsequently should be held liable for the vic-
tim's loss.,
However, the so-called "social welfare theory" has been the most
common underlying rationale upon which victim compensation pro-
grams have been based. This theory is premised on the notion that
1. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, cited in Haas, An Argument for the Enactment of Criminal
Victim Compensation Legislation in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 185, 187 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Haas].
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-84 (1973).
3. ILL. SECRETARY OF STATE, CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT, 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Secretary of State].
4. Drobney, Compensation to Victims of Crime: An Analysis, 16 ST. Louis L.J. 201, 204
(1971).
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[J]ust as modem democracy dictates public assistance for the
disabled veteran, the sick, the unemployed, and the aged, so
should public assistance be afforded the suffering victims of crime.
The argument rests not on any inherent obligation of the state but
rather on the modern conscience.5
The purpose of this article is to examine the successes and failures
of the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act. In order to accom-
plish this purpose, an investigation of the administrative channels
through which a typical claim is processed must first be made. It is
clear that the success or failure of any crime victims compensation
program depends on the efficient and quick settlement of the vic-
tims' claims. This article will also review the decisions of the Court
of Claims which have interpreted the statutory requirements which
must be met before compensation can be awarded. Finally, this
article will discuss "pecuniary loss" in light of that term's definition
in the Act' and the manner in which it has been interpreted by the
courts. The interpretation of this term is crucial in determining
which losses will be indemnified and to what extent.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT
Considering the possible number of applicants who potentially
qualify under the Act,7 few claims have been filed during the Act's
two year existence." Moreover, of the victims who have applied for
compensation only a few have had their claims reach a final disposi-
5. Schafer, The Proper Role of a Victim-Compensation System, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
45, 48 (1975). See also Note, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 531, 533
(1965); Haas, supra note 1; Secretary of State, supra note 3.
6. Pecuniary loss is defined in the Act as follows:
Pecuniary loss to an applicant under this Act resulting from injury or death to a
victim includes, in the case of injury, appropriate medical expenses or hospital
expenses, loss of earnings, loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting
from the injury. . . and ... in the case of death, funeral and burial expenses and
loss of support to the dependents of the victim. Loss of earnings, loss of future
earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim's average
monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury,
or on $500 per month, whichever is less. Nothing in this Section authorizes the
making of child support payments for the benefit of a child conceived as a result of
the rape of its mother. Pain and suffering shall not be considered in determining
pecuniary loss. Pecuniary loss does not include property damage.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (1973).
7. In the six county area surrounding Chicago there were reported 55,964 violent crimes
in 1974. There were 1,124 murders, 2,452 rapes, 30,402 robberies, and 21,986 aggravated
assaults and batteries. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 27, 1975, § 7 at 1, col. 2.
8. Only 1,623 claims have been filed since the enactment of the Act. This is a very small
percent considering the total number of possible claimants over the period through December
31, 1975. See Appendix B infra.
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tion during that time period.' This delay is traceable to the legisla-
ture's original inadequate draftmanship. Because the Act set forth
only minimal procedural guidelines, a substantial amount of time
after its enactment was spent establishing administrative proce-
dures. 0 The duty of processing claims was delegated to a number
of different state offices." This bifurcation of responsibility resulted
in many communication and administrative problems that had to
be reckoned with during the Act's early existence. Though these
difficulties may have contributed to the low number of claims set-
tled to date, it is not clear whether the design of present administra-
tive machinery is capable of handling the increasing numbers of
claims."
Other jurisdictions which have enacted victims compensation
programs have established separate administrative agencies to ex-
pedite the disposition of claims." The notable exception is
Massachusetts, 4 which delegates complete jurisdiction to its exist-
ing state courts. Illinois, on the other hand, in an attempt to keep
the cost of the program to a minimum, utilizes several existing state
offices and its state Court of Claims. 15
In order to appreciate collateral problems inherent in the admin-
istration of the victims compensation program, one must survey the
basic procedures which must be followed when filing a claim. First,
the claimant must file a notice of claim 6 at the office of the Illinois
Attorney General. This filing must be made within six months from
the date of the injury. Thereafter, the victim has two years from the
date of the injury to submit an application for compensation with
the Clerk of the Court of Claims. 7 This application is then sent to
9. Of the 1,623 claims filed only 344 claims had reached a final disposition; thus, only a
very slight number of possible applicants actually received any relief. See Appendix B infra.
10. Interview with Paul West, head of the Legal Staff of the Crimes Victims Compensa-
tion Division of the Attorney General's Office, in Chicago, September 20, 1975. [hereinafter
cited as West Interview].
11. The Attorney General's Office, Crime Victims Compensation Division in conjunction
with the Clerk of the Court of Claims are primarily responsible for the administration of the
program.
12. The Clerk of the Court of Claims projects that the number of claims will increase from
970 filed in fiscal 1975 to 1,200 claims in fiscal 1976. This increase of 330 claims coupled with
the 720 claims still pending from 1975 will certainly increase administrative problems. Memo-
randum from Robert S. O'Shea, Deputy Clerk, Court of Claims, to Michael J. Howlett, July
1, 1975 [hereinafter cited as O'Shea Memorandum].
13. See, e.g., CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-51 (1967); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 622, 623 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
14. COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 2 (1968).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 72(b) (1973), For further disscussion, see note 11 supra.
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(g) (1973).
17. Id.
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the appropriate regional office" of the Attorney General.
Once the application has reached the Attorney General's office,
program administrators begin to compile the data necessary to
reach a settlement of the claim. The administrators require evi-
dence of doctor, hospital, medical, and funeral expenses. Informa-
tion is also collected from employers pertaining to loss of earnings.
The claimant must also supply all information concerning insurance
or other benefits received from private and public sources. This data
is essential in order to compute the total compensation to which the
victim is entitled. 9
Following the assemblage of this data, the claimant's file is for-
warded to a staff investigator. In order to complete the file, the
investigator obtains a copy of the police report. At this stage in the
process the investigator interviews the claimant.20 During the inter-
view all data previously compiled is reverified and further details
concerning subsequent losses and subsequent recoveries are ac-
quired.
The most critical function of the investigator in the interview is
to explore any discrepancies between the victim's account of the
facts and statements of eyewitnesses or of the alleged assailant.
These statements are contained in the police report. The investiga-
tor's factual conclusions are synthesized into a short report which
is sent to the Attorney General's legal staff.2 The evidence uncov-
ered by the investigator is a major factor in determining whether an
award of compensation will be authorized. The findings of the inves-
tigator are heavily relied on in determining whether the claim is
fraudulent or whether the victim's injury resulted from his own
18. The state has been divided into two jurisdictions. The City of Chicago, Cook County,
and the northern Illinois counties are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Chicago
office. All other counties are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Springfield
office. Since a higher percentage of crimes are committed in the Chicago area than elsewhere
in the state, the Chicago office has processed the majority of the claims. During the first two
years of the victim compensation program, the Chicago office processed 99 claims while the
Springfield office has processed only 13 claims. Memorandum from Paul West, head of the
Legal Staff of the Crimes Victims Compensation Division of the Attorney General's Office,
to Peter Bensinger, Chief of Crime Victims Division, June 18, 1975.
19. As one official has noted:
[T]his part of the process is the most time-consuming because the victim fails to
understand that in order for all of his pecuniary loss to be compensated these losses
must be documented.
West Interview, supra note 10.
20. There are three full-time investigators in the Chicago office. The average time taken
to interview a claimant is 30 minutes. West Interview, supra note 10. See also note 22.1 infra.
21. One full-time and several part-time attorneys are assigned to the victims compensa-
tion program in the Chicago office. Also, several extern law students assist the legal staff.
For further discussion, see Appendix A infra.
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provocative conduct." After the legal staff assimilates all of the
information, it issues a recommendation as to the final disposition
of the claim. This is tantamount to the filing of an answer by the
state. The time required to prepare the recommendation varies
greatly in proportion to the complexity of the legal questions raised
under the interpretation of the Act. The preparation of the report
is a time-consuming step in processing the victim's claim.22'
Two documents are then presented to the Court of Claims-the
recommendation and an opinion based on the findings of the
recommendation. Both documents are authored by the legal staff.
The court has several options: (1) accept the Attorney General's
recommendation and adopt the proffered opinion; (2) write a new
opinion substantially in agreement with the findings of recommen-
dation; (3) reject the recommendation and author an opinion on
that basis; (4) request that the claim be argued in a hearing before
a commissioner of the court. 2 If a victim feels that the Attorney
General's recommendation is unjust, he may, by written request,
seek a formal adversarial hearing pursuant to section 79 of the
Crime Victims Compensation Act.24 The Court of Claims may, at
its discretion, deny the request for such a hearing. As a practical
matter, the recommendation of the state is usually received favor-
ably by the court and serves as the opinion of the court.25
After a decision is reached by the court, the clerk of the court
22. The statute provides that a victim may be denied an award if he provoked his assail-
ant. Provocation may also result in a reduction of the award if the provocation is not deemed
substantial. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 73(f), 77(c) (1973). For further discussion, see notes 51
and 52 infra and accompanying text.
22.1. While testifying before the United States House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Justice, December 15, 1975, in Chicago, the Deputy Clerk of the Court of Claims, Robert
O'Shea, stated:
Each claim is different. The length of the investigation depends on the complexity
of the facts and the availability of verifying bills and employer reports of earnings.
After the court makes its decisions, a check is sent within three weeks. The average
time for a claim is five months from filing to payment.
23. There are six commissioners who sit as fact finders for the full court.
24. Section 79 of the Act provides that:
The Court of Claims may on its own motion and shall upon the written request of
an applicant or other person to whom compensation has been awarded set for
hearing the question whether and to what extent an award of compensation made
under this Act should be modified. No hearing need be held, however, unless the
written request states facts which were not known to or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence could not have been ascertained by the applicant or other person . . .
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 79 (1973).
These hearings can take on an adversary setting, but only if the victim is represented by
counsel. Rarely are hearings requested or granted. Only five reported hearings were discovered
out of 160 claims researched. Rehearings are granted in the discretion of the court. Only one
claim has received a rehearing.
25. West Interview, supra note 10.
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sends notice of the decision and a copy of the opinion to the claim-
ant. If an award is made, the clerk vouchers the award for payment
by the Comptroller. If there are monies available in the fund alloted
to the victims compensation program, the victim is paid. If the fund
has been depleted by previous awards, the victim must await legis-
lative approval of new appropriations.26
A claim is processed through several stages; Illinois' procedures
are primarily administrative in that a claimant must deal with
several state offices. However, in contested claims the procedure
assumes an adversarial nature and a hearing is held before the Court
of Claims.
The Act seeks to minimize the possibility of any claim settlement
becoming adversarial, encouraging pro se determinations on behalf
of an applicant. This intent is manifested by prohibiting attorneys
from receiving fees for filing a claim for a victim. 7 It is probable that
this prohibition was made part of the Act in order to insure that the
victims would receive as much relief as possible under the program.
The forms are simplified so a victim can theoretically file an appli-
cation for compensation pro se.21 The Court of Claims has within its
discretion the power to fix reasonable attorney's fees in the event of
a hearing before the court.29 Relatively few claims are actually con-
cluded by a hearing before the court, thus the intervention of a true
adversary proceeding is rare.30 If a hearing is requested and allowed,
26. Interview with Robert O'Shea, Deputy Clerk of the Court of Claims, in Springfield,
September 1, 1975. See Appendix B.
27. Section 82 of the Act provides:
No fee may be charged to the applicant in any proceeding under this Act except as
provided in this Act. If the applicant is represented by counsel or some other duly
authorized agent in making application under this Act or in any further proceedings
provided for in this Act, that counsel or agent may receive no payment for his
services in preparing or presenting the application before the Court of Claims. He
may, however, charge fees to the applicant for representing him at a hearing pro-
vided for in this Act but only in such an amount as the Court of Claims determines
to be reasonable.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 82 (1973).
This section of the Act sets forth no penalty for disregard or abuse of its prohibitions. If,
however, a fee is charged and this fact is brought to the Attorney General's attention "appro-
priate action will be taken" and the fee is returned to the victim. West Interview, supra note
10.
28. The drafters of the Act failed to consider that most victims come from high-crime
areas. Persons who reside in these areas typically have low income and limited educational
backgrounds. Without some assistance, these victims are incapable of filing the forms or
coping with the administrative bureaucracy. The Act, by prohibiting attorney fees for such
assistance hampers victims who need relief the most and who are the least capable of securing
it.
29. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
30. See note 24 supra.
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the rules of evidence apply. The claimant must prove by competent
evidence all injuries and losses sustained."
The adversarial nature of the hearing also creates evidentiary
problems for the state. To a great extent, the state's evidence con-
sists mainly of the police report, which is inadmissible hearsay. :2
Thus, the state must go to the expense of bringing policemen and
other witnesses before the Court of Claims which sits in Springfield,
Illinois. If the claimant is not represented by counsel, the hearings
take on a less formal atmosphere, and the claimant will not be
required to strictly follow courtroom procedures. 3
The problem which has plagued efficient operation of the Crime
Victims Compensation Act is the lack of financial resources and
administrative personnel. It is obvious that this problem will inten-
sify in magnitude as the number of claims increases. 4 The absence
of adequate funding is a malady not unique to the victims compen-
sation program. If the program is to compensate all eligible victims,
it is clear that the General Assembly will have to authorize a greater
monetary committment.35
The lack of necessary manpower, while a severe problem, is one
which might be remedied with a minimum amount of effort on the
part of the Attorney General or General Assembly. The manpower
shortage is most acute in the Attorney General's Office. A limited
number of personnel are assigned to the victims compensation pro-
gram's Attorney General's legal staff.3 6 The writing of the recom-
mendation by the legal staff is the most time-consuming factor in
the entire process. In order to allow the victims to receive compensa-
tion as quickly as possible, greater manpower resources must be
31. This factor becomes especially significant if the applicant is trying to prove mental
injuries. Here the cost of such proof maybe so burdensome as to be prohibitive. For further
discussion, see note 88 infra and accompanying text.
32. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES, Im.. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 236(b) (1967).
33. West Interview, supra note 10.
34. Since passage of the Act the number of claims filed has steadily increased. This is
due to the fact that as the availability of the compensation program becomes more widely
known, more victims take advantage of the program. In fiscal 1973, there were 91 claims filed.
In fiscal 1974, there were 970 claims filed, an increase of 964 percent. While the increase for
fiscal 1975 is not predicted to be as great, percentage-wise, the Deputy Clerk of the Court of
Claims expects 1,200 claims to be filed, an increase of 330 claims over fiscal 1974. Thus,
efficient operation of the victims compensation program will become increasingly important.
O'Shea Memorandum, supra note 12.
35. Only 352 victims have received relief since the passage of the Act. O'Shea Memoran-
dum, supra note 12. However, this low number of awards has completely depleted the appro-
priations allocated by the state to the crime victims compensation program. See Appendix
B infra. The General Assembly will have to appropriate more funds to accommodate future
claims and past claims still pending. See Appendix B.
36. See note 21 supra and Appendix A infra.
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allocated to the legal staff. The purpose of the Act is defeated when
the amount of time it takes for a victim to receive aid is unreasona-
bly long. The purpose of the Act is to ease the financial burdens
imposed upon the victim. In order to accomplish that purpose, the
victim must be compensated as soon after the commission of the
crime as possible.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
The Crime Victims Compensation Act specifically states the re-
quirements which must be met before any crime victim can recover
compensation. The victim must notify the appropriate law enforce-
ment officials as soon after the crime as is "reasonably practicable
under the circumstances." 7 Failure to meet this first prerequisite
has been cited as the basis for denying compensation. 8 This re-
quirement is designed to aid police in obtaining evidence, thereby
facilitating apprehension of the criminal. Moreover, prompt notice
to the police facilitates a more complete police report. This police
report later becomes the chief tool used by the investigators and
legal staff in determining whether the applicant qualifies for relief. 9
The Crime Victims Compensation Act also requires "the appli-
cant [to have] cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in
the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant."4' The important
language of this section is the word "prosecution."'" This require-
ment assures the assistance of the victim in any subsequent crimi-
nal proceedings.
Thus, these two provisions of the Act promote one of the legisla-
tive purposes underlying enactment of the law: to encourage cooper-
ation with law enforcement officials, thereby aiding in crime pre-
vention.4" It must be noted, however, that apprehension and convic-
tion of the alleged criminal is not a prerequisite to awarding a victim
compensation. 3
Several applications for awards have been denied on the grounds
that the claimant and his alleged assailant were "related, and shar-
ing the same household."44 The Court of Claims has interpreted this
37. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(c) (1973).
38 In re Bach, 75cv303 (Ct. of Cl., July 22, 1975). In Bach, the claimant was denied
recovery because he failed to report the crime until the following day after the crime had been
committed.
39. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 20 through 22 supra.
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(d) (1973).
41. Id.
42. See Secretary of State, supra note 3.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 77(a) (1973).
44. Section 73(e) provides that:
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statutory language disjunctively, thereby creating two separate
standards for disqualification. 5 If the victim is related to the assail-
ant or if the victim and assailant are sharing the same household,
compensation will not be granted. The court has not yet articulated
what degree of kinship will disqualify a claimant.
One might posit a hypothetical situation where one spouse mur-
ders the other and is subsequently convicted and sent to prison.
Under the present language of the Act, dependent children, who are
included in the statutory definition of applicants," would be with-
out any recourse because of their familial relationship to the of-
fender. It is incredible that the General Assembly intended or de-
sired such an unconscionable result
It seems that the purpose of the kinship/domicile provision was
to prevent fraud and collusion in making claims. Still, the require-
ment leaves a potentially large class of needy victims without com-
pensation under the Act. The policy of preventing fraudulent or
collusive claims can be achieved by less drastic means. One com-
mentator suggests that rather than reject an entire class of victims
on this basis, such claimants should be required to meet a more
stringent burden of proof. 7 In order to meet this burden, the com-
mentator suggests the conviction of the assailant be a precondition
to compensation of the victim.48 However, this type of prerequisite
is overly restrictive. Under the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation
Act cooperation with law enforcement agencies is already a prere-
quisite to receiving an award.49 If a victim is willing to sign a com-
plaint, and cooperate in the prosecution of the assailant to whatever
extent the officials deem necessary, these facts alone should raise a
presumption that there is no fraud or collusion between the victim
and assailant. A victim's need is no less when the assailant is a
relative or someone sharing the household of the offender. To make
A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if: . ..(e) the victim and his
assailant were not related, and sharing the same household ....
lii.. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(e) (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the kinship/domicile provi-
sion].
45. See In re Miller, 75cv159 (Ct. of Cl., August 1, 1975). In Miller, the court denied the
award on the grounds that the assailant and the victim, although not related, were living
together at the time of the assault.
46. Section 72(a) defines applicant as
[alny person who was a dependent of a deceased victim of a crime of violence for
his support at the time of the death of that victim.
ILl.. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 72(a) (1973).
47. Note, New York Crime Victims Compensation Board Act Four Years Later, 7 COLUM.
L.J. Soc. PROB. 25, 40 (1971).
48. Id. at 41..
49. Nine claims have been denied for failing to assist law enforcement officials. See
Appendix B infra.
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relief conditional upon the status of the assailant is to deny compen-
sation on an unreasonable basis. Denial of relief to victims because
of their relationship to the assailant defeats the purpose of the Act
to aid innocent persons injured by criminal activities. This is es-
pecially true if the underlying purposes of the kinship/domicile
provision-prevention of fraudulent and collusive claims-are
already promoted by other sections of the Act.5"
A further factor which prevents fraudulent and collusive claims
and has resulted in denials of awards is a finding by the administra-
tors that the injury or crime was provoked by the victim. If the court
or administrators find that the victim substantially provoked his
assailant he is denied all relief. On the other hand, if the provoca-
tion is not deemed substantial enough to require outright denial of
a claim, the Court of Claims may reduce the amount of the total
award in proportion to the degree of provocation present.'
In all of the opinions reported to date no mention has been made
of any reductions pursuant to section 77(c). There have been many
outright denials of compensation pursuant to a finding of substan-
tial provocation under section 73(f).52 Several claims mark the outer
limits of what the court deems to be substantial provocation. In the
case of In re Adams, 53 a Chicago gang member was found slain in a
stairway of a housing project. The alleged assailant was a member
of a rival street gang. There were no witnesses to the shooting. The
mother of the victim was reimbursed six hundred and fifty dollars
for funeral expenses. This award was based on the court's finding
that rival gang membership per se does not amount to substantial
50. See notes 40 supra and 54 infra.
51. Section 77(c) states:
In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is enti-
tled,-the Court of Claims shall consider the facts stated on the application . . .
and:
(c) shall determine the degree or extent to which the victim's acts or conduct
provoked or contributed to his injuries or death and reduce or deny the award of
compensation accordingly.
i. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 77(c) (1973).
52. Section 73(f) states:
A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if:
(f) the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable
to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant. ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(f) (1973). See, e.g. In re Feutress, 75cv154 (Ct. of Cl , April 23,
1975). This case presents the typical fact situation which supports a finding of substantial
provocation. In Feutress the victim was stabbed in a barroom brawl. The Court found that
there was evidence that the victim was drinking and also evidence that the victim provoked
the altercation. Twelve claims have been denied on the basis of substantial provocation. See
Appendix B infra.
53. 75cv82 (Ct. of Cl., April 23, 1975).
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provocation. 4 The case of In re Weitzman5" also raised the issue of
substantial provocation. In Weitzman, the claimant attacked a
youth who had knocked into his daughter in a park. While the
claimant was attacking the youth some of his companions came
back and hit the applicant over the head with a baseball bat. The
court held that the claimant's actions were not substantial provoca-
tion.56 In neither of the foregoing cases did the court make mention
of section 77(c), which allows for a reduction of the award based on
a finding of less than substantial provocation. Thus, there are no
guidelines as to how a reduction for less than substantial provoca-
tion should be computed. With respect to a victim who comes to the
aid of another, the court will judge his conduct by a reasonable man
standard. In the case of In re Mounstein,57 the applicant was injured
while attempting to protect his girlfriend from being molested. The
applicant attacked the girl's assailant and was injured in the fight.
The court considered irrelevant the fact that the victim initially
attacked the girl's assailant and held that he acted as a reasonable
man under the circumstances. This reasonable man standard has
been incorporated into the statutory definition of "victim,'', with
respect to one who attempts to assist another.
PROVISIONS DEFINING Loss WHICH CAN BE COMPENSATED
Once it has been established that a valid claim exists, the remain-
ing task of the program's administrators is to compute the amount
of the award. Pecuniary loss59 is the only type of loss for which
compensation is allowed. Most awards have reimbursed the victim
for hospital and medical expenses,'" and past and future loss of
54. Id.
55. 75cv157 (Ct. of Cl., April 23, 1975).
56. Id.
57. 75cv273 (Ct. of Cl., June 2, 1975).
58. Section 72(d) defines victim as:
a person (1) killed or injured in this State as a result of a crime of violence perpe-
trated or attempted against him, (2) killed or injured in this State while attempting
to assist a person against whom a crime of violence is being perpetrated or at-
tempted, if that attempt of assistance would be expected of a reasonable man under
the circumstances or (3) killed or injured in this State while assisting a law enforce-
ment official to apprehend a person who has perpetrated a crime of violence or to
prevent the perpetration of any such crime if that assistance was in response to the
express request of the law enforcement official.
ILl.. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 72(d) (1973).
59. Pecuniary loss as defined by statute is set forth in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (1973)
(for full text see note 6 supra).
60. Medical expenses include doctor and nursing bills and medicine, In re Schwartz,
75cv33 (Ct. of Cl., March 27, 1975); (dental work) In re Pizanco, 75cv169 (Ct. of Cl., April
15, 1975); (psychological counselling) In re Kline, 75cv62 (Ct. of Cl., April 15, 1975). The
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earnings.6' In the event of the death of the victim, funeral expenses
and past and future loss of support is customarily awarded to sur-
viving dependents. 2
Compensation for loss of earnings and loss of support is more
difficult to compute and prove compared to other pecuniary losses.
The amount of compensation awardable for loss of earnings or sup-
port is limited by the Act to a maximum of five hundred dollars per
month. 3 Loss of earnings is computed by taking the victims average
monthly earnings over the previous six months.64 However, this six-
month standard has been abrogated by the Court of Claims. In In
re Levine,6" the victim, at a hearing, was denied compensation for
loss of earnings due to the fact that he had been employed for only
two weeks prior to the crime. Upon a rehearing granted pursuant to
section 79 of the Act, the court reversed itself and held that two
weeks previous employment was a sufficient period by which to
determine with certainty the loss of future earnings. The court
found that the claimant would have been able to work for the next
three months and that the cause of his unemployment was the inju-
ries sustained in the crime. Therefore, future earnings were deemed
ascertainable despite the fact that the claimant had been employed
for an extremely short period of time prior to the crime. 6 This judi-
cial alteration of the "previous employment requirement" does not,
however, have any effect on the requirement that the victim must
have been employed at the time of the crime. 7 It only changes the
court has also allowed four hundred dollars to a youth who required plastic surgery after being
stabbed by a member of a street gang. In re Thomas, 75cv211 (Ct. of Cl., May 13, 1975).
61. See, e.g., In re Zaring, 75cv21 (Ct. of Cl., February 13, 1975).
62. See, e.g., In re Miller, 75cv141 (Ct. of Cl., May 28, 1975), where the claimant received
over seven thousand dollars in loss of support when her husband, age 33, was the victim of a
homicide.
63. If the victim is out of work for less than a month the monthly earnings of the victim
is divided by 30.4, that being the average number of days in a month. The result is then
multiplied by the total number of days the victim is out of work due to his injuries sustained
in the crime. This formula simplifies and expedites the time needed to compute loss of
earnings. West Interview supra note 10.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (1973) (for full text, see note 6 supra).
65. 75cv113 (Ct. of Cl., May 7, 1975).
66. The Court of Claims measured the loss of earnings by multiplying the previous two-
week earnings by two, in order to compute the monthly loss. This result was then multiplied
by the number of months the victim was unable to work. In re Levine, 75cv113 (Ct. of Cl.,
May 7, 1975). The probable legislative intent underlying the six month criteria was to fix the
amount of loss with certainty. The court held that the only just conclusion under the facts
was that the previous two-week time period of employment was sufficient to meet the under-
lying intent of the legislature.
67. See, e.g., In re Petty, 75cv175 (Ct. of Cl., May 6, 1975) where the court found no
compensable loss when a mother applied for loss of earnings suffered when her son was
stabbed in the back and unable to work. The court denied loss of earnings because the son
had been unemployed for the previous six months.
Crime Victims Compensation
amount of time that the victim must have been employed in order
to measure the loss of future earnings. The court has not gone to the
extreme of allowing an award based on the standard of what a
victim might have earned had he been employed at the time of the
crime.
The requirement that a victim must have been employed immedi-
ately preceeding the crime may be overly harsh in some circumstan-
ces. For instance, a housewife would not be entitled to any compen-
sation for loss of earnings since she has no employer." It is possible
that the Court of Claims would accept the argument that expenses
paid by such a victim in hiring a housekeeper or babysitter while
recovering from an injury are compensable as a medical expense.
But even a broad interpretation of what expenses might by compen-
sated as medical expenses will not benefit the family of a housewife
killed during the commission of a crime. The family will not receive
any compensation for loss of her valuable services. If an unemployed
child is murdered the only loss which the family recovers under the
Act is reasonable funeral expenses."9 An exception to this rule was
formulated in In re Steele,7" where a mother received compensation
for the loss of public aid child support payments.
MANDATORY SET-OFFS
After the total allowable pecuniary loss is computed, there must
be subtracted certain statutory set-offs.7 The Act serves as a last
resort for victims whose expenses are not compensated by either
public or private insurance programs. These mandatory set-off pro-
visions penalize the victim who is prudent enough to purchase pro-
tection in the form of private insurance. The Court of Claims has
yet to be confronted with the contention that insurance premiums
should be considered as medical expenses and thus compensable as
a pecuinary loss. However, such an allowance should be made on the
rationale that the cost of insurance premiums are as much of a
medical expense as is a direct out-of-pocket payment for medical
68. See, e.g., In re Clemens, 75cv175 (Ct, of Cl., May 6, 1975).
69. See, e.g., In re Gregg, 75cv13 (Ct. of Cl., June 2, 1975); In re Gonzala, 75cv176 (Ct. of
Cl., May 6, 1975); and In re Berron, 75cv239 (Ct. of Cl., April 1, 1975).
70. 75cv30 (Ct. of Cl., January 8, 1975).
71. Section 77(d) of the Act provides that the following deductions must be made in
computing the final award:
The Court of Claims .. .(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, pay-
ments or awards, payable under the "Workmen's Compensation Act," from local
governmental, State or federal funds or from any other source except annuities,
pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first
($25,000) . ..of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 77(d) (1973).
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aid. In both situations, the victim has had to provide for his own
medical care as a result of being injured in the course of the commis-
sion of a crime.
The court has not limited set-offs to those specifically enumerated
in the Crime Victims Compensation Act. In In re Gettis,7" the Court
of Claims allowed a six hundred and fifty-four dollar set-off from the
total award, on the basis that the victim was indebted to the state
in that amount because of past due license plate fees. It is not clear
how this debt came to the Attorney General's attention or under
what authorization the court was empowered to reduce the award.
To what extent this holding will be followed remains to be seen.
Hopefully the court will not continue to abrogate the statute. Utili-
zation of the Act in the manner exhibited in Gettis is neither author-
ized nor desirable. The victims compensation program was estab-
lished to aid crime victims, not to serve as a potential collection
agency for the state.
The Crime Victims Compensation Act requires that a victim have
suffered at least two hundred dollars in pecuniary losses before he
can seek compensation.7 3 This minimum loss requirement has been
criticized on the grounds that,
[T]he primary purpose of the lower limits is to assume that the
cost of processing small claims does not exceed the benefits to
victims and society of compensating small claimants. 4
Considering the serious backlog of claims already swamping the
administrators, the minimum loss provision theoretically fulfills a
useful purpose. However, in light of the substantial number of
awards denied on this basis,75 it appears that the provision is not
saving administrative costs or time. In order to deny claims on this
basis, a complete administrative review of the claim must take
place in order to determine if the loss is greater than the two
hundred dollar minimum. Moreover, even if the minimum loss pro-
vision did in fact save administrative costs and time, the provision
is inequitable to low income victims to whom a loss of even less than
two hundred dollars could be catastrophic. Since most high-crime
areas also are low-income areas, this requirement potentially bars
many needy victims from receiving meaningful relief.
Section 77(e) of the Act fixes a maximum limit of ten thousand
72. 75cv98 (Ct. of Cl., April 28, 1975).
73. See note 71 supra. 22 claims have been denied on the grounds that the victim's loss
did not exceed two hundred dollars. See Appendix B infra.
74. Lamborn, Scope of Programs for Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime,
1973 U. ILm. L.F. 21, 54 [hereinafter cited as Lamborn].
75. See note 73 supra.
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dollars on any award.76 Most claimants who have received maxi-
mum awards were dependents of homicide victims."1 While this
amount cannot realistically fully compensate these claimants,78 it
appears that the maximum is high enough to ease the financial
burdens imposed on all other classes of claimants." One major issue
not addressed by the Act is whether mandatory set-offs should be
subtracted from the ten thousand dollar maximum, or from the
entire loss sustained by the victim. In an early decision," the Court
of Claims held that it would follow the rationale of the Massachu-
setts court in Gurley v. Commonwealth.' In Gurly the court held
that ten thousand dollars was the maximum award possible and
therefore the mandatory set-offs were to be subtracted from the
total loss sustained. This computation results in the realization of
the victim's actual monetary loss. If the actual loss is greater than
the maximum, the award would be ten thousand dollars. This for-
mula is in accordance with the rationale underlying the Crime Vic-
tims Compensation Act. If the set-offs were subtracted from the ten
thousand dollar maximum, fewer awards would be made. It is likely
that in homicide cases loss of support to the family alone far exceeds
the maximum allowable award.82 In most instances, a homicide
victim's dependents do receive some sort of benefits from private or
public sources. If these benefits exceeded ten thousand dollars, but
did not recompense the victim for all losses suffered, absent the
Gurly rationale, this class of claimants would be denied compensa-
tion under the language of the Act.
Property loss is expressly excluded from the statutory definition
76. Section 77(e) of the Act provides:
In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled,
the Court of Claims shall consider the facts stated on the application . . . and: (e)
shall offer or award, as the case may be, the resultant amount or $10,000, which
ever is less, to the applicant or, if the victim is deceased, to be apportioned among
the persons who were dependent on him for their support at the time . . . of the
crime...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 77(e) (1973).
77. Of the 19 maximum awards allowed in the first two years of the victims compensation
program, 14 went to dependents of homicide victims.
78. Loss of support alone to a family of a homicide victim who is the head of the household
is usually well over the statutory maximum. See, e.g., In re Simpson, 75cv12 (Ct. of Cl., Jan.
31, 1974); In re Spivak, 75cv14 (Ct. of Cl., April 23, 1975); In re Miller, 75cv141 (Ct. of Cl.,
May 28, 1975); In re Burrage, 75cv148 (Ct. of Cl., May 13, 1975); In re Redmond, 74cv80 (Ct.
of Cl., July 1, 1975).
79. The statistical fact that only five victims, other than victims of homicides, qualified
for the maximum award shows that most victims who have received compensation under the
program thus far have had their entire loss compensated.
80. In re Simpson, 75cv12 (Ct. of Cl., Jan. 31, 1974).
81. 296 N.E.2d 477 (Mass. 1973).
82. See note 78 supra.
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of pecuniary loss.83 The Act does not compensate for stolen property.
It is obvious that the cost of compensating for property losses would
be so burdensome as to be prohibitive. 4 Furthermore, proof of prop-
erty loss is much more difficult to document and thus more easily
susceptible to fraud. Denial of property loss has been attacked as
being inconsistent with the underlying purpose of a victims compen-
sation program. This criticism is based on the fact that property loss
in the case of low-income victims may be a greater hardship than
personal injury. 5
MENTAL INJURIES AND PECUNIARY Loss
Pain and suffering is not compensated for under the Crime Vic-
tims Compensation Act, and is explicitly excluded from the defini-
tion of pecuniary loss.88 The General Assembly's probable reasons
for not allowing such compensation can be attributed to several
factors. First, to grant relief for such loss would greatly add to the
cost of the program.87 Secondly, loss attributed to pain and suffering
is extremely difficult to measure objectively. Pain and suffering is
so subjective that it may vary in degree depending on the individual
victim. Thirdly, to allow compensation for pain and suffering might
lead to awarding relief for fraudulent or exaggerated claims. Finally,
disproving such loss might well necessitate testimony of witnesses
expert in areas such as psychological testing and physical examina-
tion, which would add to the cost of the program and encourage
adversarial proceedings. Moreover, from the victims' viewpoint, the
cost in attempting to prove pain and suffering may be so prohibitive
that it is not worth a claimant's efforts in view of the ten thousand
dollar maximum award limitation."'
Only two jurisdictions 9 in the United States allow for pain and
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (1973) (for full text, see note 6 supra).
84. In 1974, the number of reported property crimes in Illinois was 362,370. Since the
inception of the Act only 127 victims of violent crimes have been compensated. To attempt
to compensate any of the 362,370 victims of property crimes would add a burden to the
program. Furthermore, in order for the program to attempt to compensate this great number
of victims, the General Assembly would have to appropriate a prohibitivly large sum of
money. Statistics concerning property crimes reported in Chicago Tribune, Nov. 27, 1975, §
7 at 1, col. 2.
85. Lamborn, supra note 74 at 2-29.
86. ILL. RE. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (1973) (full text of statute in note 6 supra).
87. As one commentator noted: "Compensation for pain and suffering accounted for al-
most 38 percent of the average 1972 Hawaii award." HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, FirtH ANNUAL REPORT (1973), cited in Lamborn, supra note 74, at 36.
88. Lamborn, supra note 74, at 33-40.
89. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 351-33(4), 351-52(2) (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-5(c)
(Supp. 1972). For a more complete discussion on whether or not recovery for pain and suffer-
ing should be granted see Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury,
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suffering to be compensated under crime victims compensation leg-
islation. The experience of at least one of these jurisdictions in the
administration of its program has lent credence to the criticisms
against allowing relief for this type of loss. The Hawaii Board of
Commissioners, the administrative agency in charge of that state's
compensation program, reported the following findings:
As a practical matter, the evaluation of pain and suffering and the
amount awarded for it, has been the most difficult aspect of our
deliberations. Of necessity, pain and suffering is unique to each
case and it is impossible to establish objective criteria for its
measurement. The lack of such criteria makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to assure that each qualified applicant is receiving a
fair and equitable award. 0
Even though these criticisms are well taken it is important to
remember that pain and suffering might be the only substantial loss
incurred by a victim of some violent crimes. Chief among these
types of crimes are sexual offenses. One commentator argues that
compensation for pain and suffering should be allowed because
[plain and suffering are very real parts of the victim's injuries,
and may be severe and permanent. For some crimes the only item
of injury may be non-physical. For example, in three-fourths of the
cases of forcible rape the victim suffers no physical harm apart
from the sex act itself. To urge compensation for rape, as public
opinion is thought to require, and then to deny benefits because
there is not loss of income or medical expense is said to mock the
victim and play havoc with consistency.92
This inconsistency is especially distressing when one considers the
latest statistics on the crime of rape.2
The Crime Victims Compensation Act expressly lists rape among
the violent crimes for which the Act intends to allow victims to be
compensated. 3 However, to date only two rape victims have re-
ceived any compensation under the Illinois program. These claim-
ants received awards primarily because they incurred extenuating
50 MINN. L. REV. 271, 278 (1965); Comment, Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence,
30 ALBANY L. REV. 325, 332 (1966); Comment, Crime Victims Compensation: The New York
Solution, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 717, 731 (1971).
90. HAWAII CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 4-5
(1969), cited in Lamborn, supra note 74, at 33.
91. Lamborn, supra note 74, at 37.
92. Rape . . . is the fastest-growing of the nation's most violent crimes. Inci-
dents of rape jumped 9 percent last year, 165 percent in the past fifteen years-and
it is estimated that at least three rapes occur for every one reported.
Footlick, Rape Alert, Newsweek, November 10, 1975, at 70, col. 1. For further discussion, see
note 7 supra.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 72(c) (1973).
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medical expenses. One victim, a fifteen year old girl, required
lengthy hospitalization due to a stab wound inflicted during the
rape .4 The second compensated victim was pregnant at the time of
rape. The rape caused a miscarriage which precipitated a longer
hospitalization than is usually necessary in rape cases. 5 Neither
victim received any compensation for any pain and suffering. The
low number of rape victims compensated thus far under the victims
compensation program points out a major deficiency in the Act
when one considers the number of rape victims who qualify as po-
tential claimants." The medical expenses usually incurred by rape
victims would be below the minimum loss requirement of two
hundred dollars set forth in the Act. Therefore, the ultimate effect
of defining pecuniary loss to exclude pain and suffering is to deny
relief to victims of rape, the fastest-growing violent crime.
While pain and suffering will not be considered in measuring the
victim's compensable loss, the Act does not explicitly preclude com-
pensation for mental injuries. Several provisions in the Act use the
term "injury"97 but the Act neither defines that term specifically nor
restricts its meaning to physical harm. If the legislature had in-
tended to limit the type of injury compensable, it should have ex-
pressly written the statute in such a way as to make this intention
clear. New York's statute is an excellent example of legislation
which expressly describes the type of injury which is compensable. 8
Since the Illinois legislature did not follow the example of the New
York statute, it is arguable that it must have intended to compen-
sate mental as well as physical injuries. The Court of Claims in In
re Lohr99 held, however, that it would not decide the issue of whether
injury as defined by the Act included mental as well as physical
injuries.
The claimant contends that the word "injured" under the defini-
tion of victim in §2(c) of the Act, and the word "injury" as used
in §4, do not preclude psychological injury or mental or nervous
shock. Whether those words are limited to physical injury alone
need not be decided in this case since the claimant introduced no
evidence of mental or nervous shock. Her claim for loss of earnings,
94. In re Tanaka, 75cv22 (Ct. of CI., May 1, 1975).
95. In re Newton, 75cv739 (Ct. of Cl., July 1, 1975).
96. There were a reported 2,452 rape victims in Chicago and its surrounding six counties
in 1974. However one must note that a large number of rapes go unreported to the police.
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 27, 1975, § 7, at 1, col. 2.
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 72(d), 73(b), 73(f), 74 (1973).
98. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631-1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970) ("physical injuries").
99. 75cv40 (Ct. of Cl., August 22, 1975).
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due to her self imposed absence from work was based solely on her
fear of future assaults."'0
If psychological injuries are compensable, the issue then becomes
one of defining the class of psychological injury which will be com-
pensated. The Act precludes pain and suffering from being held to
be within this class, but does it also preclude mental and nervous
shock from being compensated? Some emotional trauma arguably
afflicts every crime victim. This emotional trauma is characterized
by the Court of Claims as a state of "general anxiety and specific
fear.""" Decisions of the Court of Claims indicate that defining
these mental conditions and distinguishing between them is very
difficult. Jurisdictions which do compensate for psychological inju-
ries have compensated, for example, a shopkeeper who sold his busi-
ness and retired because of his fear of being alone at night, after he
was assaulted and robbed one evening.102 The Court of Claims ex-
plicitly rejected this line of cases. In In re Lohr,0 3 the court further
rejected the contention that fear alone could be the basis for remain-
ing away from work and held that a victim could not recover loss of
earnings.'"4 The claimant in Lohr was a Chicago high school teacher
who, after having her life threatned seven times and being assaulted
three times, refused to continue working at the school. All of the
incidents were reported to the proper school and law enforcement
officials. The victim cooperated fully in the apprehension and prose-
cution of her assailants, even to the extent of testifying against them
in juvenile court. The claimant sought compensation for lost wages
for 99 days which she incurred when she refused to go back to work
because of her fear of further harm. In denying this victim any relief
for lost earnings the Court of Claims stated:
We find nothing in the Act that authorizes payment for loss of
earnings due to fear. It is readily apparent that a different interpre-
tation would open the state treasury to a plethora of claims for lost
earnings by persons afraid to work in high crime areas.05
Therefore, it is apparent that the court will neither directly allow
compensation for fear as an injury nor allow a mental state which
indirectly causes loss of earnings to be compensated under the Act.
The Lohr court may have overlooked its own precedent in finding
that it had never considered the question of whether psychological
100. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
101. In re Kline, 75cv62 (Ct. of Cl., April 15, 1975).
102. Criminal Injuries Compensation Awards - January, 1966, CRIM. L. REV. 237 (1966).
103. In re Lohr, 75cv40 (Ct. of Cl., August 22, 1975).
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id.
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injuries could serve as a basis upon which to grant compensation for
loss of earnings. In In re Kline,06 the court awarded compensation
for loss of earnings due to psychological injury under circumstances
similiar to those in the Lohr case. The Kline court allowed loss of
earnings under the following circumstances. The victim and her
boyfriend were robbed by a black assailant armed with a pistol. The
claimant received minor physical injuries when she fell down while
fleeing from the scene of the crime. She was awarded compensation
for loss of earnings for 42 days. The court found
[Tlhat the claimant was unable to work for a period of six weeks
following the assault due to a general anxiety state and a specific
fear of all black men, which kept her in her apartment for six
weeks. 107
The Kline court further recognized the validity of psychological
injury when it allowed the victim to receive compensation for the
cost of psychological counselling." However, this relief was not
granted as aid for the loss as a direct injury but rather under the
guise of medical expenses, which are explicitly authorized under the
definition of pecuniary loss. 09 Thus, the court has exhibited a will-
ingness to indirectly allow compensation for psychological injury
when that injury consists of both general anxiety and a specific fear
and this mental state results in other measurable pecuniary loss.
The Kline case is factually indistinguishable from the Lohr claim.
Both victims received minor physical injuries and had their lives
threatened. Each victim stayed away from work for long periods of
time because of a well-founded fear for their safety. In neither claim
was mental or nervous shock alleged, nor did either victim seek
compensation for the psychological injury per se. Yet one victim was
compensated for loss of earnings caused by a mental condition or
state of mind, and the other was not. The only distinction offered
was that in Kline the victim had a general state of anxiety and a
specific fear which caused her to incur loss of earnings. In Lohr, the
victim voluntarily stayed away from work but only because of her
admittedly "well-founded" ' 10 fear. Future claims concerning com-
pensation for mental injuries, either directly or indirectly under the
guise of some other pecuniary loss, demand a more consistent review
than has been announced by the Court of Claims in its past deci-
106. 75cv62 (Ct. of Cl., April 15, 1975).
107. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 3.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (1973) (for full text, see note 6 supra).
110. In re Lohr, 75cv40 at 3 (Ct. of Cl., August 22, 1975).
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sions. Hopefully, the court will expand the definition to allow for
compensation for mental injury per se.
CONCLUSION
The Crime Victims Compensation Act is a significant step in the
right direction. The Act imposes a legal and moral obligation upon
the state to aid innocent victims of violent crimes. However, the Act
does not compensate all innocent victims; it denies recovery to vic-
tims who are related to or sharing the same household as their
assailants. The purpose of this classification is to prevent fraudu-
lent, collusive and exaggerated claims. This purpose is adequately
met by other sections of the Act. The legislature must take steps to
abolish this inequitable classification.
The Act purports to compensate rape victims, but the statutory
definition of "pecuniary loss" is so restrictive that it denies mean-
ingful relief to most victims of one of the fastest growing violent
crimes. This inconsistency between the purpose and effect of the Act
must be remedied. One solution would be for the Court of Claims
to interpret injury to include psychological injuries and allow appro-
priate relief. The court has moved to some extent in this direction
by allowing awards to claimants where the psychological injury is
the cause of medical expenses or loss of earnings. The next logical
step would be to extend this rationale and allow compensation for
psychological injuries per se. Obviously, the entire problem could be
totally alleviated by the General Assembly amending the definition
of pecuniary loss to include compensation for pain and suffering.
The compensation program is administered by a process which
allows maximum benefits to go to the victim. The program does
allow the victim to pursue his claim outside purely administrative
channels by requesting a full adversarial hearing. The main criti-
cism of the administration of the program is that the present process
takes too long in settling the claims, thus delaying disbursements
of relief to victims. Two major problems now hamper the efficient
operation of the Act: lack of financial resources and lack of sufficient
manpower to properly administer the compensation program. Fail-
ure by the appropriate state officials to remedy the deficiencies can
only serve to further delay or deny victims of violent crimes the
relief they need and are entitled to under the Act.
JOHN J. DURSO
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APPENDIX A
The legal staff serves several functions in the administration of the vic-
tims compensation program. It compiles the initial data and authors the
recommendation which is sent to the Court of Claims for approval. The
figures show that a majority of the claims listed as active are being worked
on by the legal staff in the data compilation stage. Of those 130 claims past
this initial stage, 98 are once again either waiting for the attention of the
legal staff or the staff is in the process of authoring the recommendation.
These figures represent the status of the program as of June 18, 1975.
However, without a greater allocation of manpower to the legal staff, the
speed with which claims are processed will not increase to the level re-
quired to meet the increased number of claims expected.
Status of claims on file as of June 18, 1975
32 Claims in the Investigators files
49 Claims assigned to the legal staff.
49 Claims awaiting to be assigned to legal staff.
590 Claims in which the application is filed and just listed as active.
720 Pending claims which are backlogged from Fiscal 1975
APPENDIX B
Grounds upon which awards were denied through June 30, 1975:
22 denials based on loss not greater than $200. § 73(b)
12 denials based on a finding of substantial provocation § 73(f)
9 denials based on failure of victim to assist law enforcement officials
§ 73(d)
6 denials based on finding victim injured before program took effect.
denials based on finding victim and assailant living together or
related § 73(c)
1 denial based on finding that there was no evidence of a crime
1 injury due to accident not caused by crime.
1 denial because harrassment is not compensable
3 denials; in which no reason given in the opinion.
57 = Total number of reported denials.
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